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Abstract 
 
In this paper, the definitions of subjective well-being have been reviewed with 
a focus on its emotional core, which we consider to be the ratio of positive to 
negative affect over time. The reviewed evidence showed that negative emotions 
tend to be of longer duration than positive and that the NA system produces 
stronger emotional responses than the PA system. Also, a variety of experimental 
results show that negative stimuli make unique demands on cognitive resources 
(particularly perception and attention) compared to positive stimuli. The evidence 
that the negative affect system produces stronger affective output, per unit input, 
than the positive affect system, is a phenomenon known as negativity bias. I also 
went so far as to argue that negativity exceeds positivity by a factor of pi (3.14) and 
that efforts to speed adaptation to negative events may be more important to 
overall SWB then efforts to prolong responses to positive events (Larsen and 
Prizmic, 2008). The fact that negativity is stronger than positivity, combined with 
the notion of differential adaptation (people adapt faster to good events than to bad 
events), creates the conditions that drive the hedonic treadmill. However, most 
people are, to some degree, able to overcome the psychological forces of the 
hedonic treadmill and maintain at least a modicum of emotional well-being 
(Biswas-Diener, Vitterso, & Diener, 2005). It is likely that the ability called 
"emotional intelligence" refers in large part to the capacity to manage negative 
affect following unpleasant or stressful events (Larsen & Learner, 2006). 
Moreover, such an ability is likely to be made up of particular behaviors and 
strategies that each contributes specifically to the management of negative 
emotions (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004). 
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In everyday life people react to events with different pleasant or unpleasant 
emotions. People are also able to reflect to their life as a whole over a specific time 
period and provide a global judgment of their level of happiness or subjective well-PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 18 (2009), 2, 247-266 
being (Diener, 2000). The topic of subjective well-being has captivated the 
attention of researchers for over three decades. By examining what is the "good 
life" for an individual and making inferences what is the "good life" of population, 
researchers invoke many other disciplines beside psychology (Diener, Kesebir, & 
Lucas, 2008; Dolan, Peasgood, & White, 2008). However, psychologists have also 
given some attention to the components or building-blocks of subjective well-
being. 
 
Components of Subjective Well-Being 
 
In psychological terms, subjective well-being (SWB) is a multi-faceted 
construct, consisting of several components, such as evaluative judgments of one’s 
life, positive memories, feeling a purpose in life, optimism, and the relative 
amounts of positive and negative affect over time (Kim-Prieto, Diener, Tamir, 
Scollon, & Diener, 2005). Empirically, however, the facets of this construct 
coalesce into three distinct components; a cognitive component consisting of 
judgments of life satisfaction, and an emotional component consisting of high 
levels of positive affect and low levels of negative affect (Arthaud-Day, Rode, 
Mooney, & Near, 2005; Diener, 2006). 
Although those components are empirically correlated, they are nevertheless 
theoretically discriminable from each other (Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 1996). In 
population studies these three components emerge as distinct but related factors, 
and some studies show different roles for positive and negative emotions in terms 
of how they relate to life satisfaction judgments in different nations (Arthaud-Day 
et al. 2005; Kuppens, Realo, & Diener, 2008). 
Life satisfaction correlates moderately with high positive affect (PA) and 
inversely with negative affect (NA), but is nevertheless a cognitive judgment that is 
at least conceptually distinct from affective processes. Life satisfaction show high 
levels of stability in adulthood (Diener & Larsen, 1984; Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 
2006; Eid & Diener, 2004) and is most likely difficult, though not impossible 
(Lucas, Clark, Georgellis & Diener, 2004), to change in substantial ways (Fujita & 
Diener, 2005; Pavot & Diener, 2008). Although life satisfaction to some extent may 
be influenced by affective states or contextual factors, mostly it represents an 
integrated judgment of how one’s life as a whole is going, and it is based on many 
different aspects or domains of person’s life (see review Pavot & Diener, 2008). 
The emotional components of positive and negative affect, on the other hand, are 
much more reactive to situational influences, and more amenable to efforts to 
manage or remediate these affective states (Chow, Ram, Fujita, Boker, & Clore, 
2005). 
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The Emotional Core of Subjective Well-Being 
 
Emotional well-being (EWB) can be conceived of as a composite of PA and 
NA that comes and goes and has a momentary character reflecting one’s emotional 
status quo at any given moment. As these momentary states accumulate over time, 
they summate into something like a running composite, such that they begin to 
reflect a central tendency or characteristic level of EWB, around which the person 
fluctuates. As such, trait measures of EWB always inquire about some time period 
(e.g., "how have things been over the past ten years") rather than about some 
moment in time (e.g., "how are you feeling right now," Larsen & Prizmic, 2006). 
Evaluating people’s emotional experience over time using some form of experience 
sampling (i.e. ecological momentary assessment, day reconstruction method) rather 
than restrospective reports, should be more accurate for assessing the relation 
between positive and negative emotions as well as for understanding how a series 
of affective states, both positive and negative, are integrated into an overall 
judgment of happiness (Kahneman & Krueger, 2006; Schimmack, 2003).  
There are interesting questions about how people integrate their momentary 
states into an aggregated judgment of their long-term SWB (Kahneman, Krueger, 
Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004). For example, more recent emotional states 
appear to be more heavily weighted in such overall judgments than states more 
distal in time (Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996). Nevertheless, people do make this 
integration when asked "over time" questions, and their answers to such questions 
conform to typical psychometric standards of reliability for trait measures. 
Moreover, answers to affective questions worded in trait terms also appear to have 
construct validity, i.e., converge with concurrent SWB measures, predict future 
measures, correlate with related constructs such as self-esteem and peer reports, and 
show discriminant validity (Larsen & Augustine, 2008; Larsen & Diener,1985).  
Almost all of measures of SWB correlate highly with EWB, defined as the 
ratio of positive affect (PA) to negative affect (NA) in a person’s life over a 
representative time period. For example, Larsen and Diener (1985) had subjects 
keep daily records of the emotions they were feeling for a period of between 30 to 
90 days. The authors then calculated the ratio of total positive to total negative 
affect for each subject over entire period of daily reporting. This measure correlated 
moderately to strongly with a wide variety of questionnaire measures of subjective 
well-being that are widely used in surveys and psychological research. The authors 
concluded that, although different theorists define SWB differently, most SWB 
measures correlate highly with the ratio of PA to NA assessed over time, 
suggesting an emotional core to global subjective well-being. Even life satisfaction 
judgments are highly correlated with the ratio of PA to NA assessed over time 
(Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). The following formula depicts the 
emotional core of well-being: 
EWB = ∑(PA) / ∑(NA) 
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This formula for emotional well-being (EWB) has several important and 
interesting implications. One implication is that, for this ratio to convey maximum 
information, the numerator (PA) and the denominator (NA) must be orthogonal. To 
date, there is a great deal of evidence that, when assessed over time (i.e., as traits or 
average tendencies), the amount of positive affect in people’s lives is uncorrelated 
with the amount of negative affect (e.g., Diener & Emmons, 1985; Schmukle, 
Egloff, & Burns, 2002). This independence of trait PA and trait NA is important 
because the ratio of highly correlated scores would provide redundant information 
with the components, making the EWB ratio less useful. Moreover, the basic 
finding that trait PA and trait NA are uncorrelated has lead researchers to search for 
the specific mechanisms that give rise to each (Larsen, & Prizmic, 2006).  
A second important implication from the above ratio formula is that it suggests 
two routes to increasing EWB; one might work on maximizing the numerator (PA) 
through the pursuit of frequent pleasures, or one might work toward minimizing the 
denominator (NA) through the diminishment of unpleasant emotions. This notion is 
similar to William James’ idea about how happiness is the ratio of one’s aspirations 
to one’s accomplishments in life, wherein he suggested that one could increase 
happiness by either decreasing one’s aspirations or increasing one’s 
accomplishments (or both). Moreover, the ratio formula for PA and NA assumes 
equality between the numerator and the denominator, such that efforts geared 
toward increasing PA could be redirected toward decreasing NA, and the overall 
effect on SWB would be the same. This assumption that PA and NA influence 
SWB equally (though of opposite sign) is questionable. 
 
Asymmetry Between PA and NA 
 
The contribution of PA and NA to emotional well being is not equal in 
magnitude. Many researchers have pointed to an asymmetry in PA and NA, with 
the negative affect system being more reactive than the positive affect system. Ito 
and Cacioppo (2005) described positive and negative motivational systems with 
their separable activation functions. The PA system is characterized by the 
positivity offset, which refers to a tendency for the positive motivational system to 
be above the neutral point at rest, i.e., when evaluative input is weak or absent. 
Secondly, the negative motivational system is characterized by a negativity bias, 
which refers to greater responsiveness at increasing levels of input, i.e., 
demonstrating a gain in output per unit input. In accordance with this theory, 
evidence supports greater responsivity to negative stimuli than positive stimuli 
(Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Ito & Cacioppo, 2005; Ito, Larsen, Smith, & 
Cacioppo, 1998). Also, the existence of the negativity bias is largely supported in 
the literature (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001). Baumeister and colleagues (2001) review and summarize a great 
deal of data, from a variety of sources, all of which converge on the general idea 
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that "bad is stronger than good," and that there is tendency in humans to be more 
attentive to, and more thoroughly process and recall, negative information 
compared to positive information. In general, a negative event of value -X will 
produce a stronger affective response than positive event of value +X. As implied 
by the negativity bias, there appears to be a gain function built into the negative 
affect system such that this system produces a larger response, per unit input, than 
the positive affect system. Larsen (2002) reviewed evidence that negative affect is 
stronger than positive affect. Larsen (2002) also reported on several studies that 
directly compare negative and positive affect in terms of their reactivity, duration 
and cognitive involvement. 
 
Reactivity Asymmetry 
 
In one experience sampling study Larsen (2002) demonstrated that equivalent 
levels of objectively bad and good events produce relatively higher levels of NA 
than PA, respectively. He had 62 subjects record their daily emotions and life 
events everyday for 56 consecutive days. Each day, in the evening, subjects 
assessed a variety of emotions scored for positive affect (PA) and negative affect 
(NA). Subjects also recorded the best and worst event that day, which were later 
separately rated by independent raters for how good or bad those events would be 
for the average person. Based on those objective event ratings, days with good 
event ratings greater than one standard deviation above the mean and days with bad 
event ratings greater than one standard deviation above the mean were separately 
aggregated. The results showed that self-reported PA on the good days and self-
reported NA on the bad days significantly differed on days that are, on average, 
equivalent in hedonic severity. Expressed in standard score units, average PA on 
the positive days was .78, whereas average NA on the bad days was 1.33. The 
difference is significant and consistent with the idea that NA reactivity has a gain 
function, such that equivalent levels of objectively bad and good events produce 
relatively higher levels of NA than PA, respectively. 
 
Duration Asymmetry 
 
It has long been argued that people adapt to good events at a faster rate than 
they adapt to bad events (Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978), suggesting 
that positive emotions habituate or return to baseline faster than negative emotions. 
Also, the asymmetry of duration of positive and negative emotions on 
cardiovascular activity is reported in work of Brosschot and Thayer (2003). They 
found that duration of cardiovascular responses after a negative stimulus was more 
prolonged than the cardiovascular response after a positive stimulus. 
In another experience sampling study, Larsen (2002) directly examined the 
question of duration of positive and negative affect. Three times a day over 28 days 
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subjects rated their level of PA and NA. The occasions with PA and NA greater 
that one standard deviation above the subject’s mean (time T) were lagged. Then 
the participants’ following three occasions were examined (i.e., at time T+1, T+2, 
and T+3). In other words, the rate of adaptation for PA following an especially 
positive event, and the rate of adaptation for NA following an especially negative 
event were examined by looking how fast they return toward baseline following 
somewhat extreme (+ 1 SD) emotions. Results showed that PA droped to baseline 
fairly quickly after an extreme PA occasion (within one time period, which was six 
hours), while NA remained higher than expected for two time periods following an 
extreme NA occasion. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the rate of 
adaptation, defined as a return toward baseline, is faster for PA than for NA. 
 
Asymmetry in the Cognitive Processing of Positive and Negative Stimuli 
 
Several studies in the literature have shown that negative events, compared to 
positive events, capture more attentional resources and are stored in memory in a 
more accessible manner (Musch & Klauer, 2003). Larsen and Prizmic (2008) 
reviewed several examples how attentional resources are more involved in the 
processing of negative events than positive events. For example, in an emotional 
Stroop task, where subjects have to respond as quickly as possible to name the 
color of a presented word, it has been found that negative words elicit slower color 
naming as compared to neutral words (McKenna & Sharma, 1995; Pratto & John, 
1991). The few studies that have investigated positive words (e.g., Dalgleish, 1995; 
Pratto & John, 1991; White, 1996) typically do not find any attentional capture 
effects for positive words, i.e., they are processed at about the same speed as neutral 
words. 
Affective priming is another cognitive paradigm used for studying the 
cognitive processing of affective stimuli. Generally, in affective priming studies, an 
affective prime (e.g., a word such as "rotten") is briefly presented (for example 200 
ms), followed by another word, the target, that is either emotionally consistent with 
the prime (e.g., "maggot") or inconsistent (e.g., "kitten"). The subject’s task is to 
categorize the target word as positive or negative as quickly as possible. In such 
experiments, results typically show significant congruency effects; that is, faster 
word evaluation when prime and target have the same valence than when they are 
of opposite valence. Beside this outcome, the effects of positive and negative 
emotional primes are not symmetric; stronger priming effects are observed for 
negative primes than for the positive primes (Hietanen & Korpela, 2004; Smith, et 
al., 2006). 
In a study of cross-modality affective priming (Nesse & Larsen, 2009) we used 
auditory primes (positive and the negative sounds) followed by visually presented 
target word that the participants must categorize as positive or negative as quickly 
as possible. For example, positive sounds were children laughing and negative 
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sounds were of a woman being beaten. The emotional sound primes were obtained 
from the Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention (Bradley & Lang, 2007). 
Affective sounds were presented through earphones, and the target word appeared 
on a computer screen five seconds after the sounds had started. The subject’s task 
was to categorize the target word as positive or negative as quickly as possible after 
it appeared on the screen. Accuracy was calculated as error rates for each congruent 
(e.g., negative sound paired with a negative word) and incongruent (e.g., negative 
sound paired with a positive word) condition, as well as separately for negative and 
positive primes. Results are presented in Figure 1. The highest rate of errors was 
found in trials where negative sounds preceded positive words (e.g., negative 
incongruent condition) while errors rates with positive sounds as a prime, in both 
congruent and incongruent conditions, produced essentially similar error rates. 
Results suggest that negative sounds produce substantially more affective 
interference than positive sounds. 
 
Figure 1. Affective Priming Results:  
The average errors rates for congruent and incongruent conditions with positive and 
negative sounds as prime type, and bad and good words as target 
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The Affective Simon task is another example of a cognitive task used in 
research on cognition and emotion, developed by DeHouwer and colleagues 
(DeHouwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001; DeHouwer & Eelen, 1998). In 
this paradigm the participant is instructed to respond by saying "positive" or 
"negative" to words depending on whether they appear in upper or lower case, 
while ignoring the content of the words themselves. The words, however, are 
valenced, and hence the positivity or negativity of the word can be congruent or 
incongruent with the correct response. Subjects are faster to respond "positive"(than 
"negative") to a positive word, and faster to respond "negative" (than "positive") to 
a negative word, which simply demonstrates a congruency effect. However, when 
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the valence of the word is incongruent with the response, interference is created and 
reaction time is slower for incongruent compared to congruent trials. Moreover, the 
interference effects are not symmetric for positive and negative stimuli. Having to 
say "positive" to a word that is negative produces a much larger interference effect 
than having to say "negative" to a word that is positive (Larsen & Yarkoni, 2009). 
Results are presented in Figure 2. These findings support the notion that negative 
stimuli capture more attentional resources than positive stimuli, thereby interfering 
more with providing a correct response to negative incongruent stimuli (to which 
one must say "positive") than positive incongruent stimuli (to which one must say 
"negative"). 
 
Figure 2. Affective Simon Task:  
The average reaction time in ms for congruent and incongruent conditions 
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Another paradigm used to study the cognitive processing of emotional stimuli 
is in the area of facial expressions. Studies using visual search paradigms typically 
find that people are faster in detecting threatening faces than nonthreatening faces 
(e.g., Fox, et al., 2000; Tipples, Atkinson, & Young, 2002). In such experiments, 
researchers have used schematic faces created by manipulation of the eyebrow 
angle (i.e.  or  angle) and the shape of the mouth (i.e.  or  shape), which at 
the same time allows the researchers to control total stimulus value of the schematic 
faces. Fox and colleagues (Fox et al., 2000) found that participants were faster to 
detect angry faces against an array of either happy faces or neutral faces compared 
to the detection of happy faces in the same conditions (but against the neutral and 
angry faces). Another study showed that scheming faces (smiling but with a 
furrowed brow) are also detected faster than happy ones, supporting the idea that in 
general threatening faces, not only specific ones, are detected faster than 
nonthreatening ones (Tipples, Atkinson, & Young, 2002). 
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Larsen and colleagues (Larsen, Bono, Augustine, & Prizmic, 2009) replicated 
these experiments using for stimuli schematic faces that portrayed five different 
expressions: angry, scheming, happy, sad and neutral. The schematic faces were 
displayed in each of the nine cells of a 3 x 3 display matrix, with half trials 
containing one face different from surrounding faces, and the other half displaying 
faces that were identical to each other. The participants had to search the nine faces 
and decide as quickly as possible if there was one different face, or if all faces in 
the nine cells were the same. Participants responded "same" or "different" by 
pressing a button as quickly as possible. Mean reaction times to detect a unique 
facial expression displayed within a matrix of other faces are presented in Figure 3. 
As predicted, participants were faster to detected angry and scheming facial 
expressions than all others. These findings also support asymmetry of the 
perceptual processing of positive and negative stimuli, in that threatening faces 
(angry and scheming) were detected much faster than all other unique faces.  
A final task used to study the cognitive processing of emotional stimuli is the 
flanker task. Originally developed in studies that examine whether people can 
exclude distracting stimuli while responding to relevant ones (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
1974), the flanker task is now used in many modified versions (Horstmann, 
Borgstedt, & Heumann, 2006; Pecchinenda & Heil, 2007). Generally, in this task 
participants respond to a flanker stimuli that appear on the sides of a central stimuli, 
while ignoring that central stimuli. For example, a color word (e.g., GREEN) can 
be the central stimuli, and the flanker can be a color patch that is congruent (e.g., 
green) or incongruent (blue) with the target stimulus. The subject is instructed to 
ignore the central stimuli and respond to the flanker. In this example, which has 
much in common with the original Stroop task, the participant’s job is to ignore the 
word GREEN and process and respond to the color patch to the side of that stimuli. 
In the emotion version of this flanker task used by Larsen et al. (2009), the 
target was an emotion word that was either positive (e.g., "serene") or negative 
(e.g., "morgue") or neutral (e.g., "noodle"). Flanking the central stimulus word were 
two digits, one on the left and one on the right of the central stimulus word. The 
participant’s job is to respond "same" if the two digits were the same number, or 
"different" if the two digits were different numbers. As they scan their eyes over the 
two numbers, participants invariably read and semantically process the central 
word, even though they are told to "ignore the word that appears on the screen and 
only tell us if the two numbers on either side of it are the same or different from 
each other." The hypothesis is that, if threatening stimuli (i.e., the negative words) 
capture more attentional resources than positive words, then the reaction time to 
judge the flanker numbers will be longer for the negative words than the positive 
words (calculated as interference scores by controlling for how long it takes to  
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Figure 3. Visual Search Results: Average reaction time in ms for detecting each of 
presented schematic faces as ‘same’ or ‘different’ in the 3x3 matrix 
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respond to the neutral words). Results are presented in the Figure 4 and show that 
in both conditions (i.e. to respond "same" or "different") reaction times were much 
slower when negative words were used as the central stimulus, compared when 
positive or neutral words were used. These findings support the hypothesis that 
negative stimuli interrupt cognitive processing to a significantly greater extent than 
positive stimuli. 
 
Figure 4. Digital Flanker Test:  
The average interference scores (RT to emotion word minus RT to neutral control word) 
in ms for congruent and incongruent conditions for positive and negative words  
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The results of these experiments on the cognitive processing of positive and 
negative stimuli consistently support the negativity bias and show that negative 
stimuli are more impactful than positive stimuli when it comes to perceptual and 
attentional tasks. Across a variety of cognitive paradigms, ranging from visual 
search to priming tasks, there is substantial evidence that the effects of positive and 
negative stimuli are asymmetrical, with negative stimuli producing larger effects 
than positive stimuli.  
 
Implications of PA and NA Asymmetry in SWB Research 
 
The asymmetry between PA and NA in terms of reactivity, duration, and 
cognitive involvement has important implications for understanding their respective 
roles in determining overall emotional well-being. In order to maintain a positive 
hedonic balance (the ratio of PA to NA over time) one would need to balance many 
PA experiences to make up for each NA experience. In other words, because "bad 
is stronger than good" one would need to compensate for each negative affective 
episode with stronger or more frequent positive episodes. By implication, if one 
could limit or shorten one’s experience of negative emotions, this would have a 
larger impact on overall emotional well-being than equal efforts directed toward 
amplifying or prolonging positive emotions. 
To give an example of how PA and NA do not equally contribute to SWB we 
turn to a report on results of an experiment on physiological reactivity to pleasant 
and unpleasant stimuli (Larsen, Cruz, Ketelaar, Welsh, & Billings, 1990). Here the 
authors recorded skin conductance, heart rate, and facial muscle contractions while 
subjects viewed pleasant and unpleasant photographic images. They predicted that 
a questionnaire measure of SWB would correlate with diminished NA reactivity 
and enhanced PA reactivity in terms of physiological responses to the hedonic 
stimuli. However, they found only the former. That is, happy people did not exhibit 
increased autonomic activation to the positive images, rather they exhibited 
diminished autonomic reactivity to the negative images. In more than a 
metaphorical sense, happy people did not smile more, they mainly frowned less, 
i.e., were less reactive to the negative stimuli. It could be that the key to 
maintaining a positive hedonic balance is not so much to seek out pleasure and 
positive emotions as much as it is an ability to short-circuit negative emotions. 
Because NA has a stronger impact on our subjective sense of well-being, self-
regulation efforts to limit NA would be more effective than the same amount of 
effort directed toward increasing PA. 
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How Much Stronger is NA over PA? 
 
While many researchers have documented that NA is stronger than PA, few 
have taken up the question of just how much stronger NA is compared to PA. This 
question is important to well-being researchers, because the answer will tell them 
the minimum ratio of PA to NA that is required for a satisfying level of SWB. 
However, there are inherent difficulties in any empirical attempt to quantify how 
much stronger NA is compared to PA. On the surface, the question appears to be a 
simple dose-response type of question; how much larger must the "dose" of 
positive stimulation be to evoke a positive response that is equivalent in size, but 
opposite in valence, to a given negative response? Or, alternatively, how much 
different are PA and NA responses to equivalent "doses" of hedonic stimulation? 
One might be tempted to approach the question with psychophysical methods. 
After all, emotions are internal representations of events in the external world, just 
as sensations are internal representations of the physical world. Psychophysical 
methods yielded great advances in our understanding of sensory processes. 
However, in sensory psychophysics, exact sensory responses were determined 
because the researchers had the ability to precisely control, manipulate, and 
objectively measure a physical stimulus, e.g., light intensity, weight, sound 
pressure, etc. Sensory responses could then be precisely mapped onto objective 
levels of stimulation, and response functions could be determined. For example, 
auditory sensation conforms to a log rhythm function of input stimulation. We do 
not, however, have equivalent manipulation or measurement precision in the area 
of emotional stimulation. It is simply impossible, at this point, to equate or 
manipulate emotional inputs with enough precision to allow precise mappings of 
emotional response onto emotional input. We simply cannot calculate emotional 
response functions for PA and NA with anywhere near the precision we can do so 
for visual or auditory response systems. 
Despite this inherent difficulty, a few researchers have come forth with 
statements about just how much stronger NA is compared to PA. Usually the 
statements are in the form of the critical ratio of PA to NA necessary to maintain 
some global state. Perhaps the first researcher to venture such a statement was the 
marital researcher John Gottman (e.g., 1994). In this research program Gottman 
was examining differences between couples whose marriages were satisfying and 
long lasting and couples whose marriages were dissatisfying and in dissolution 
(they had filed for divorce). Gottman (1994) had each couple engage in a 
conversation on a topic of conflict in their marriage, and videotaped the 
conversations. Later the videotapes were coded for positivity and negativity 
expressed both verbally and in observable expressions of emotion. Among the 
couples in satisfying marriages, the ratio of positive to negative emotions expressed 
in their conversations was 5.1 to 1 for verbal content and 4.7 to 1 for emotional 
expressions. Among the couples who had filed for divorce, the ratio of positive to 
negative emotions was 0.9 to 1 for verbal content and 0.7 to 1 for emotional 
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expressions. In other words, the unsatisfied couples experienced and expressed far 
fewer positive to negative responses in their conversations compared to happily 
married couples. 
Larsen (2002), using two different experience sampling data sets, with daily 
emotion ratings gathered over 30 to 90 consecutive days, calculated the percentage 
of days where PA exceeded NA. Over all subjects, the percentage of days that PA 
exceeded NA turned out to be 73% in one sample and 76% in the other. In other 
words, the average person would expect to have three good days for each bad day, 
leading him to the conclusion that positive emotions must prevail over negative 
emotions by a force of 3-to-1 if a person is to maintain an average level of SWB. 
Viewed this way, one negative day has the counter-valent force of three positive 
days. Larsen (2002) also examined the beta weights using average daily PA and 
average daily NA in regression equations predicting questionnaire measures of 
SWB. Across a number of global SWB reports, the standardized beta weights for 
NA were approximately 3 times the size of the standardized beta weights for PA. 
So, while average daily PA and average daily NA are uncorrelated with each other, 
and while they both contribute to, or significantly correlate with, global SWB 
measures, the overlap between SWB and NA nevertheless exceeds the overlap of 
SWB and PA by a factor of approximately 3-to-1. 
Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz et al. 2002) took up the 
question of the ratio of PA to NA in a study of psychotherapy for depression. PA 
and NA were measured both before and after treatment in a sample of 66 depressed 
men. Before treatment, the ratio of PA to NA averaged 0.5 for this sample of 
depressed males. After treatment, participants showing typical levels of remission 
of their depressive symptoms (N = 23) were found to have a PA/NA ratio of 2.3, 
whereas those participants showing optimal remission (judged by self-report and 
clinical ratings, N = 15) were found to have a PA/NA ratio of 4.3. Those subjects 
who showed no remission of their depressive symptoms were found to have a 
PA/NA ratio of 0.7, a value not significantly different from pre-treatment baseline.  
Fredrickson and Losada (2005) explicitly take up the question of the critical 
value of PA-to-NA ratio necessary for flourishing, and they put this question to 
several different data sets. In one data set they examined the interpersonal 
behaviors of business teams as they worked on an annual strategic plans. The 
verbal behaviors of each team member were coded for expressed PA (e.g., showing 
support, encouragement or appreciation) and NA (e.g., expressing disapproval, 
sarcasm, or cynicism). Objective indicators of performance (e.g., profitability, 
customer satisfaction, evaluations by superiors, etc) were used to derive an index of 
overall quality of the team. Without going into the complex dynamical analysis, 
Fredrickson and Losada (2005) concluded that a PA-to-NA ratio of 2.9 to 1 divided 
those teams who were flourishing from those teams that were languishing.  
Using another data set, Fredrickson and Losada (2005) report the results of an 
experience sampling study on college students covering 28 consecutive days of 
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emotion reports. For each participant they calculated a PA/NA ratio over the month 
of daily reporting. They divided the samples into participants who were flourishing 
versus those who were not using a measure of positive social and psychological 
functioning. The authors report that, in the two samples, the participants who were 
flourishing had a PA/NA ratio of 3.2 and 3.4, whereas those participants who were 
not flourishing had PA/NA ratios of 2.3 and 2.1.  
In searching for the answer to how much stronger NA is compared to PA, 
Larsen and Prizmic (2008) summarize from the above studies that the magnitude 
difference between PA and NA has a wide range, going from 2.3 to 5.1 across 
samples in the published literature. Such a range is likely due to sampling 
fluctuation, i.e., influenced by the nature of the measures that go into calculating 
PA and NA, as well as by the specific life domains in which the measures are 
obtained, e.g., marital behaviors, affect displayed during team work, etc. Moreover, 
any estimated value will always be within a range determined by the reliability of 
the measures of the component indices (i.e., the measures of PA and NA). Larsen 
and Prizmic (2008) suggested that in the absence of a precise value, a good first 
estimate would be the expected value or average of the estimates found in the 
literature. Since the average of the estimates found in the literature is slightly over 
3.0, Larsen and Prizmic (2008) suggest that the value of pi ( or 3.14) be used as 
the best estimate of how much stronger NA is to PA. In other words, the negativity 
bias refers to the fact that negative experiences produce effects that are 
approximately three times larger than positive experiences. 
The negativity bias, according to Larsen and Prizmic (2008), can thus be 
defined mathematically as:  
|PA| *  = |NA| 
where the absolute value of NA is pi times the absolute value of PA. Consequently, 
the equation for affect balance necessary to achieve minimal levels of emotional 
well-being can be restated as: 
EWB = ∑(PA) / (∑(NA/) 
 
Negativity Bias and the Hedonic Treadmill 
 
A theory of well-being relevant to the negativity bias concept is the hedonic 
treadmill theory, originally proposed by Brickman and Campbell (1971). This 
theory holds that people adapt to both good and bad events and return, over time, to 
their hedonic set points. For example, after an extremely good event, such as 
marriage to the person of their dreams, a person initially reacts with strong positive 
affect but eventually adapts and returns to his or her baseline level of positive 
affect. A similar adaptation process occurs for negative events; after a bad event a 
person initially reacts with strong NA but eventually adapts and returns to his or her 
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baseline level of NA. The hedonic treadmill theory received some support in 
Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bullman’s (1978) classic study of lottery winners 
and paraplegics. Studying both lottery winners and persons who lost their ability to 
walk, Brickman et al. (1978) concluded that both groups were not substantially 
different from control groups one year after the good (winning the lottery) or bad 
(becoming paraplegic) events.  
In a re-analysis of the Brickman et al. (1978) data, Diener, Lucas and Scollon 
(2006) report that the paraplegic subjects were actually 0.75 standard deviation 
units lower in subjective well being than the control group after one year, 
suggesting that full adaptation to this negative event had not yet occurred. This 
finding is consistent with the negativity bias concept, that negative events produce 
relatively more intense and longer lasting affective reactions than positive events. 
This adds a twist to the hedonic treadmill theory by implying that adaptation rates 
to good and bad events are not symmetrical; we adapt more quickly to good events 
than equally hedonic (but opposite in sign) bad events. This notion was implied in 
Brickman et al.’s (1978) conclusions, lending an especially pernicious quality to the 
hedonic treadmill model. That is, not only do we adapt to good events, but we do so 
at a faster rate than we do to bad events. If we assumed that good and bad events in 
life happened randomly, and in equal proportions, then human life would be 
doomed to a preponderance of misery and negative affect.  
In a rarely cited commentary on Brickman and Campbell’s (1971) introduction 
of hedonic treadmill theory, McClelland (1971) reacted to the deterministic nature 
of the hedonic treadmill, which, as portrayed, acts as a universal law forcing all into 
the role of victim of hedonic principles. McClelland urged an alternative view on 
the ubiquity and power of the hedonic treadmill: "But surely there must be some 
element of choice here. A man can be taught the laws of hedonic relativism and 
learn how to gain greater satisfaction from life. He can choose his own goals and 
comparison groups and use all that we know about how to minimize dissatisfaction 
or maximize satisfaction to make a better life for himself and others." (McClelland, 
1971, p. 304). In other words, people may learn to regulate their affective responses 
to overcome the effects of the hedonic treadmill.  
In a more recent review of hedonic treadmill theory, Diener, Lucas, and 
Scollon (2006) come to a similar conclusion. While agreeing with the basic facts of 
hedonic adaptation, Diener et al. (2006) offer several revisions to the hedonic 
treadmill theory to account for the fact that people are not doomed to unhappiness. 
One important revision, consistent with McClelland’s observation, is that there are 
wide individual differences in adaptation rates. Diener et al. (2006) present data that 
adaptation is not nearly so inevitable or automatic as is implied by the original 
theory. The rate and extent of adaptation to various events shows wide variability 
across individuals. 
From the perspective of the evidence reviewed in this paper, the hedonic 
treadmill represents the strong pull of the negativity bias on human subjective well-
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being. This pull is overcome to the extent that people are able to manage their 
negative emotions. Because the negative affect system is more reactive, of longer 
duration, and more demanding on our cognitive processes, the best route to 
increased emotional well being will be the one that focuses on remediating and 
managing our negative emotions. Does this mean that there is no role for managing 
positive emotions? Of course not, positive emotions are important. But evidence 
reviewed here suggests that negative emotions are three times more important in 
terms of influencing overall emotional well being. 
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